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Abstract 
European professional football is suffering for its popularity. As the global demand for the 
sport has increased, the revenues involved has followed in its tracks. At the same time, the 
profitability of the industry has been falling. The rest of the introduction in in detail about 
possible theories explaining this. As these clearly hints towards a complex problem with 
similarities of an escalation archetype, the goal of the thesis was to develop a strategic 
management tool mainly based on the BSC and system dynamics simulation to improve 
understanding of the current, historical and future behavior of the system. This effort became 
into a working simulation model that reproduced the current situation of revenue growth and 
increasing demand. Finally, the author believes that the simulation clearly provide 
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European professional football is suffering for its popularity. As the global demand for the 
sport has increased, the revenues involved has followed in its tracks. At the same time, the 
profitability of the industry has been falling. This is widely accepted to be caused by win-
maximizing mentalities, in contrast to being mainly profit-maximizing, such that the 
competition for talent has driven player wages rocketing upwards (Hamil & Walters 2010; 
McNamara et al. 2013; Millward 2013; Morrow 2013; Plumley et al. 2014; Senaux 2008; 
Solberg & Haugen 2010; Storm & Nielsen 2012). Storm and Nielsen (2012) sums up the 
situation in a good manner:  
The problem is that expectations of increasing revenue and profit, at the level of individual 
football clubs prove to be illusionary for the majority of the clubs. It all adds up to a destructive 
sporting arms race at the aggregate level when the majority of the clubs strive to make it to the top. 
The result is a bloated demand for players and subsequently too high expenditures for all competitors 
involved. (p. 192) 
As long as the revenue keep increasing, there is always one club willing to pay a little extra to 
get the star players. Competing clubs then have the choice to accept this and lose their best 
players, along with superior sporting performance, or increase the amount of wages they offer 
the players. Figure 1 shows a simplified illustration of this escalation archetype.  
 
Figure 1: Escalation archetype. 
Because of this, professional football clubs, especially European, are being operated on the 
brink of insolvency, with financially sustainable clubs rather being the exception. Capelo and 
Dias (2009) finds that there are clear financial challenges associated with competing at the 
top level. This is based on statistics, which implies that the most successful teams, with 
unusual exceptions, have not yet been able to implement and sustain an effective business 
model. Additionally, they find that there is a high level of indebtedness for big football teams 
across Europe and other federations. For the 80 teams in the Champions League and Europa 
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League, 65 percent have net losses. Over 15 year ago, Forrest and Simmons (2000) 
researched the relationship between pay and performance in different sporting sectors. They 
found that the “cost of success in the English Premiership has risen dramatically since 
1992.”(p.18) A vast amount of literature concerning sports management reports on the 
difficulties of managing these firms. Cunningham (2013) calls for a further reflection and 
analysis of theory in sport management, while Parent and Harvey (2009) points at the lacking 
ability to explain partnerships between sport organizations. Others recognize that there have 
been plentiful of good research on theory within sports management, but they conclude that 
the literature is walking along the same path and needs some sort of change of direction to 
extend its scope (Washington & Patterson 2011). According to Woratschek et al. (2014) there 
is need for a better understanding of sport-specific phenomena and more appropriate 
solutions to management problems. They suggest that this requires a new perspective on 
sports markets. Doherty (2013) states the importance of theory-building research, which is a 
process of establishing new variables and identifying relationships among existing ones. This 
can be achieved by extending existing theory from other disciplines that might have broader 
applicability. They all seem to agree on the fact that there is need for a better way to both 
create and measure value in a professional sport clubs. Sceptics may claim that the recent 
developments in theory of sports management is simply down to the fact that we can, and that 
sport nerds can play with data and make findings that are not easily transferred to the 
traditional business management literature. However, as Bryson et al. (2015) points out, sport 
is big business. People employed in sports and related activities represented 5.4 percent of the 
work force in 2007. He further points out that sport generated values of 407 billion euros in 
2004.  
 
Figure 2: Worldwide interest in football. Adapted from Premier League 11/12 Season Review. (BPL  2012) 
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As in the case of European football, and especially in the Barclays Premier League (BPL), 
the vast amount of money involved are continuously increasing. Deloitte, which have an 
annual ranking of the highest earning clubs, clearly see this (Jones 2015): 
With almost half of the top 30 now made up of Premier League clubs, it is with great 
anticipation that we wait to see what the new round of Premier League broadcast deals, expected to 
be agreed in 2015, will yield. With the market expectation that another significant increase will occur, 
it is likely that the Money League will have a predominantly English appearance in the coming years 
(p. 4) 
This can be underlined by the agreed broadcasting deal for 2016-19, which sums up to a 
staggering 5.14 billion pounds to be distributed between the clubs in the league over a 3 year 
duration (BBC 2015).  
 
Figure 3: Adapted figure on rise of Premier League TV income. From BBC (2015). 
 
For the reasons stated above, there has been a flood of foreign owners buying clubs in the 
countries that allows this corporate structure. The clubs in the BPL have a corporate structure 
bearing most resemblance with a “standard” business model, as opposed to the “socio-model” 
in Spain where the fans own the club (Murphy 2010). This makes the BPL attractive for 
foreign investors/ owners looking to make an investment in the club. The motivation for this 
is primarily financial, with the aim of increasing the value of the club and then selling it 
making a profit. In 2010, half of the BPL clubs had foreign owners. Nauright and Ramfjord 
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(2010) examines this surge of arrivals, mainly consisting of American owners. With ever 
more increasing television money because of the expanding global market, they observe the 
following: 
While the structures of leagues differ between North America and England, it is clear that the 
trend is towards a globalized business model that began in North America and is sweeping the world 
as investors seek to maximize profits in diversified sport, entertainment, leisure, media and property 
portfolios. (pp. 438-439) 
 
Russian and Middle Eastern groups of investors, sometimes characterized as financially 
irrational (Scelles et al. 2014), have entered the market in the recent years as well. The 
claimed financial irrationality might be a brand building strategy before the effects of 
Financial Fair Play (FFP) come in to play. The FFP is meant to be a regulation that will help 
the clubs participating in the European Cups to be financially sustainable. Lack of 
compliance to the rules will, at least officially stated, lead to exclusion of participation or 
other impairments. One could imagine that some of the owners assert significant control over 
the sponsorship money the Union of European Football Associations (UEFA) itself is 
collecting from e.g. the Champions League. In addition, these type of owners have access to 
some of the best lawyers in the world, which makes the process of placing bans/ restrictions 
on clubs that violate the rules a long and difficult one.  
The recent corruption scandals in the international football association (FIFA) strengthens the 
argument for use of proper management and governance tools in sport management (BBC 
News  2015). The documentary “Dispatches – How to Buy a Football Club” sheds a light on 
this dark side of the football industry where a former captain, and at the time global 
ambassador, for Manchester United Football Club is heavily involved in an underground 
operation strictly conflicting with regulations from the governing body of association football 
in England (Sanders 2011). 
Where to go 
These challenges clearly signal the need for an approach better suited to the sports 
management as the usual frameworks for corporate governance and strategy is not universally 
applicable to these organizations. As could be expected, a number of academics have already 
supplied different models and perspectives supposed to manage these hurdles. (Kartakoullis 
et al. 2013) claim that football executives need to adopt a more holistic value-based outlook, 
going beyond purely financial perspectives. Capasso and Rossi (2013) have also taken notice, 
and focus their analysis on professional football teams because “...this special business 
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combination provides an evident example of companies whose performance cannot be 
evaluated considering only financial returns or shareholder value.”(p. 218) This is based on 
the fact that a substantial amount of assets for a professional football club are intangible 
(players, coaches, fan loyalty, global brand, talent development, scout network efficiency, 
etc.). They summarize this with: “A professional football team strategy requires a multi-
constituency systemic approach to be effectively implemented and to correctly evaluate its 
performances.”(p.216) Woratschek et al. (2014) propose a sport value framework(SVF) 
based on a service dominant logic developed by Vargo and Lusch (2004): 
In our view, applying the SVF and considering sport events as platforms for co-creation will 
lead to new insights in sport management research and practice, as managing a platform (value 
network) is different from managing a production process (value chain). Therefore, researchers and 
practitioners should be open to breaking new ground and developing new management 
approaches.(p. 21) 
 
As most authors delivers some theoretical frameworks, few actually provide an operational 
method. The work of this thesis will be to build upon this and develop a method/ modelling 
simulation to better understand the underlying basis for value creation. As football clubs have 
many different aspects and perspectives to consider, it would be appropriate to be able to 
analyze them separately while capturing the causality between them. As Chelladurai (2013) 
agreeably puts it: “It is also quite satisfying when one is able to bring concepts from far-off 
fields as an explanatory tool in addressing a problem at hand.”(p.22) Using a dynamic 
balanced scorecard(DBSC) to capture this complexity would be a plausible method. 
Examples of this is already illustrated by many different authors implementing the DBSC in 
case studies (Akkermans & Van Oorschot 2005; Barnabè 2011; Bianchi & Montemaggiore 
2008; Capelo & Dias 2009). The method/model explained in the thesis will hopefully be 
applicable to other fields than football clubs, as most sport organizations operate under the 
same principles.  
Problem statement 
Develop a dynamic balanced scorecard that demonstrates how the use of system dynamics 





The following literature reviews, along with basic information of football clubs and the 
football industry in general, presents the previous work that forms underlying logic and 
assumptions of the model. 
Football-specific information and literature 
To make the incentive for including this section clearer, suppose the reader of this paper are 
to step into the role as managing director, or a position of similar sorts, for a professional 
football club. The first task assigned by the board of directors involve the development of a 
computer simulation to guide the club with its strategic choices. Assuming he/she has 
minimal or no prior experience with the football industry, profound knowledge of every 
operational aspect is not required, but it is necessary to have a decent overall understanding 
of the system. This includes the basic structure, decision rules and flows of both information 
and physical entities. For starters, a football match consist of two football teams playing each 
other and the team that scores the most goals win, unless there is a draw. These teams 
compete with other teams in a league system, so a win is awarded with three points while a 
draw gives one. The winner at the end of the season is the club with the most points. There is 
eleven players on each team and the manager usually have three available substitutes per 
match. As different players will be unavailable at some point during each season because of 
injury and other factors, a manager need a playing squad with more than just 11 players. The 
football club can get players in two ways. One is from other clubs through buying them out of 
their existing contracts or signing them on a free transfer if their contract has less than six 
months remaining. The exclusive right to use players are called player registrations and the 
value of a player is often calculated based on the fee the club has to pay for this player 
registration. For professional clubs, the transfer fee is somewhat analogous to an investment 
in new production equipment. Most top European clubs also have their own junior academies 
where they develop young promising talents, and this is the other way of getting new players 
to the squad. As these players have no transfer fee associated with them, there is no cost of 
capital. However, it should be noted that few of these young players are promoted to the first 
team. On average, for every 20 aspiring footballers, only one of these make the cut. The 
manager has the opportunity to make changes to the team during what is referred to as a 
transfer window. This is when the trading of player occurs between teams. In most leagues, 
there are two of these. One during off-season and one mid-season. Different leagues have 
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different rules, but usually a team have to register 25 players accessible to use in matches. 
Junior players and players below a certain age are usually excluded from this rule.  
Like most other organizations, professional football clubs are trying to capture and create 
value using different business models. Capturing value comes in the form of financial profit 
while value creation is assumed to be performance that is satisfactory to fans and other major 
stakeholders. As stakeholders have different interests and views of  value constitutions, Slack 
and Parent (2006) writes about the importance of identifying strategic constituents/ 
stakeholders in professional basketball organizations and understand their value criteria. 
Table 1 provides a modified version with stakeholders and their criteria adapted for a 
professional football club. These criteria display what the different stakeholders find 
important and could serve as guidelines to identify segments in the football industry that 
should be taken into consideration when running a football club. 
Table 1: Modified table for stakeholder criteria for football clubs (Slack and Parent 2006). 
Stakeholders Criteria 
Owners Profit, increased value of team 
Players Adequate salary, good working conditions 
Supporters Entertaining games, reasonable priced tickets, concessions 
Community Visibility through team activities, economic benefits for local businesses 
Media Newsworthy coaches and players 
National 
Association 
Compliance with rules, effort to promote a positive image of the game 




Senaux (2008) adds another dimension to this in his paper about using a stakeholder approach 
to football club governance in Europe that, according to him, “seems far more appropriate to 
analyse fully the complex environment of professional football clubs” (p. 5). He mention that 
other authors have found two typical attributes for stakeholders: power and legitimacy. They 
are fairly self-explaining, but nonetheless deserve an explanation. A stakeholder possessing 
value that is hard to replace for the firm, has leverage to influence decisions if it sees a reason 
for it. Claimant stakeholders consider themselves entitled to achieve attention so their own 
objectives can be met. Building on these, he goes on to explain the concept of urgency:  
Urgency is the level of immediate attention demanded by the stakeholders. It is a 
combination of time sensitivity and criticality of the claim. Introducing this notion of urgency 
enables changing a static model into a more dynamic one where time is present, as well as 
changes in the attributes. It clearly appears that the potential relationship can be as relevant 
as the actual one. (p. 8) 
Summed up, a stakeholder with the urgency attribute needs attention, and needs it as soon as 
possible. Table 2 summarizes the set of attributes associated with a stakeholder classification. 
Table 2: Table for stakeholder attributes and classification (Senaux 2008). 
Types/Attributes Power Legitimacy Urgency 
Latent stakeholder:    
Dormant X   
Discretionary  X  
Demanding   X 
Expectant stakeholder:    
Dominant X X  
Dependent  X X 
Dangerous X  X 




For the owner(s) of a football club, capturing and creating value (e.g. profit and increased 
value of the team) has significant importance. Certain industries have distinct recipes or ways 
of achieving this, as McNamara et al. (2013) points out. They draw comparisons between 
football clubs (or team sports in general), the movie industry, consulting and higher 
education. Executing strategies in these settings requires extended use of human resources 
instead of physical. These industries can be categorized as talent-based industries where 
competitive advantage is dependent on attracting the best talents. They specifically mention 
that there are four different business model approaches in the English Premiership Football, 
based on two value-creating resources and capabilities. These are the total talent of a team 
and the shared team experience being accumulated over time. These four business models 
and the results of their study can be seen in Figure 4.  
  External Market Value of Talent 
































Business Model 1: 
‘B’ Team Talent 




 Low value creation 
 Low value appropriation 
Results 
 Low value creation 
 Moderate value appropriation 
 
 
Business Model 4: 
‘A’ Team Talent 




 Moderate value creation 
 Low value appropriation 
Results 
 Moderate creation 







Business Model 2: 
‘B’ Team Talent 




 Moderate value creation 
 High value appropriation 
Results 
 Low value creation 
 High value appropriation 
 
 
Business Model 3: 
‘A’ Team Talent 




 High value creation 
 High value appropriation 
Results 
 High value creation 
 High value appropriation 
 
Figure 4: Adapted figure of business model configurations by McNamara et al. (2013). Reprinted with permission. 
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They deduce that the two stable configurations are business models 2 and 3, as 1 and 4 are 
intermediate steps towards 2 and 3, respectively. More specific, business model 1 that is 
based on buying players with lesser talent with low shared team experience will at some point 
transition to business model 2, because the players will accumulate shared experience by 
playing together unless they are constantly replaced. The same applies for business model 4, 
except that the club buys premium talent and the eventual transition to business model 3 
could take more time if the players being brought in get replaced before the team gets time to 
build experience. Therefore, if the owner/ shareholders of the club has less interest in value 
creation and/or is more risk averse then business model 2 with lower talent presumably gives 
as good a financial return as business model 3, but with smaller risk. Both of these transitions 
of the business models indicate a typical worse-before better scenario. The authors measure 
value creation as league points at the season end, value appropriation as annual profits 
divided by total annual sales, player talent as player value and firm specific talent (shared 
team experience) as the average number of actual playing minutes players in the team played 
with each other. Measuring the progress of these different variables in a professional football 
club is noticeably dependent on many of the standard financial components in normal 
companies, while having unique industry-specific characteristics. Regular components in the 
financial structure of all professional sport organizations are capital employed, operating cash 
flows, assets and return on capital employed (Kartakoullis et al. 2013). Rossi et al. (2013) 
claims that the main revenue streams come from ticket and season-tickets, stadium 
management, sponsorships, merchandising and broadcasting revenues. They also provide six 
typical costs: wages and salaries, intangible assets depreciation, financial costs, extraordinary 
expenses, other production costs and other depreciation. Among these, the salary of the 
players and coaches is by far the largest carrying cost. The main fixed assets are property and 
player registrations. Property (for example training ground and stadium) are tangible assets 
with minor difficulties in determining its value, because standard evaluation techniques for 
these are generally agreed upon. Intangible assets are usually more difficult to evaluate. 
Because intangible assets make up a substantial part of a football club’s assets, this makes 
valuation of the entire club using a standard method even more challenging. Using a 
discounted cash flow method does not work very well because of the unpredictable, and often 
negative, cash flows involved. Consequently, revenue multiples are often used instead 
(Markham 2013). Forbes has an annual report where they compare the value of the biggest 
clubs, but their method is not publicly available. Several researchers have tried to develop a 
reliable valuation model (Markham 2013; Scelles et al. 2014; Vine 2004), as this would 
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reduce the uncertainties involved in sales of the clubs. The method proposed by Markham 
(2013) that is based on just five variables can be seen below. 
𝐶𝑙𝑢𝑏 𝑉𝑎𝑙𝑢𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 =
(𝑅𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑛𝑢𝑒 + 𝑁𝑒𝑡 𝐴𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡𝑠)  ×






He explains the rationale behind the revenue figure as: 
Revenue generation includes all the cash generated by the club in a financial year. It is 
extremely important within the football industry and the underpinning factor of UEFA and the EPL’s 
financial controls. A club’s revenue figure is added to its net assets as these underpin a club’s ability 
to generate future revenue and consequently make up the backbone of the valuation model. (p.17) 
For the wage ratio, he explains that: “Finally, the overall figure is divided by a club’s wages to 
revenue ratio. This illustrates a club’s ability to control its major expenditure and the lower the 
percentage the higher the club’s final valuation.” (p.18) 
Scelles et al. (2014) tries to build upon this model by incorporating player valuations, 
operating income and new ownership. They also mention that club assets including stadium 
age, supporter numbers and income, club sponsorship type and past performances are 
variables that also should be taken into consideration as they have a significant impact on the 
club. Because of the previously mentioned large part of assets being intangible, many may 
find these methods too simple at first glance. Nonetheless, Kahneman (2011) argues that 
simple algorithms are often more predictive and accurate than the intuitive judgements from 
human experts (e.g. brokers).  
Another important group of stakeholders are the customers. This group is divided into three 
parts: the sponsors, media and fans. How these stakeholders perceive the club is the focus of 
this perspective. Notice that they are also highly dependent upon each other. The sponsors are 
interested in exposure to potential customers through media coverage of the club. These 
potential customers, clearly, being football fans watching the club’s matches broadcasted or 
in the stadium. Media companies that buy the rights from the football association to show 
league matches calculate their bid on the size of the perceived demand for matches 
broadcasted worldwide. This demand is significantly influenced by the overall attractiveness 
of the league compared to the individual clubs. Koenigstorfer et al. (2010) finds that the 
perceived competitive balance of the league is important to maintain a level of perceived 
attractiveness. Club brand is also a concept that stands central in this discussion of 
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attractiveness. As the commercial revenue of the top clubs are a big part of total revenues, 
brand management related to sponsors and fans becomes an important aspect in the strategic 
management.  
According to Solberg and Haugen (2010), the European football industry differs from other 
industries regarding the trading of players and the consequences this might have. In the 
language of systems theory, path dependence has led to a pattern where big clubs with 
massive revenues continuously buy the best players from smaller clubs. In case of financial 
problems at the top, these problems might end up cascading downwards to the smaller clubs 
that are used to make a stable revenue out of this trading. Carmichael et al. (2011) also claim 
that that investment in players’ skills will buy success on the pitch, with rich clubs becoming 
richer and spending more on players than less successful clubs. This makes for a typical 
feedback loop. They also mention that club revenue in a season mainly come from match day 
attendance, membership packages, sales of broadcasting rights and sponsorships deals. 
Likewise, Plumley et al. (2014) adds that on-pitch performance and financial performance are 
related, although there is uncertainty bounded to what is the cause and what is the effect. 
Figure 5 illustrates this reinforcing feedback loop.  
 
Figure 5: Reinforcing feedback loop in football clubs. 
Bryson et al. (2014) finds that correlation between sales of broadcast rights and club payrolls 
is almost unity. The research was done on Italian clubs, but it is reasonable to expand this and 
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make the assumption that revenue in general and club payrolls are strongly correlated. That 
being said, there is a time delay to the causality as player agents take notice of a clubs recent 
rise in revenue and puts pressure on raising player wages when negotiating new deals.  
The balanced scorecard 
The balanced scorecard (BSC) is a performance measurement tool developed by Kaplan and 
Norton (1996) with the intention to give managers a more balanced view of how to 
effectively manage and implement their strategy. It contains financial and non-financial 
measures carefully identified as key performance indicators (KPIs). This means that 
managers are supposedly be able to track their strategy implementation by monitoring this 
chosen set of indicators. These indicators could be lagging or leading in nature, while a mix 
of both is to be strived for. The lagging indicators give feedback on the effect of certain 
causal relationships and are often financial in nature. The leading indicators are usually more 
obscure or hard to pinpoint as these, if the assumed causality is actually correct, convey the 
outcome one might expect if the goals of these indicators are achieved. Typical leading 
indicators is customer base, market size, etc. These indicators usually assumes that increased 
revenue is a consequence of the firm selling to more customers, while e.g. customer 
satisfaction contributes to selling more to customers the firm already have. 
By default, the traditional BSC has four different perspectives with the financial perspective 
considered the most “important” perspective and can usually be found at the top of strategy 
maps. It is often described with how shareholders look at the firm. In simpler terms, it 
contains the financial goals that needs to be fulfilled for the shareholders to be satisfied. The 
financial perspective is mainly governed by the shareholder’s policy for financial structure 
and the different financial objectives underpinning the strategy.  
The next step is the customer perspective, or how the firm is viewed by the customers. It is 
assumed that if the firm can satisfy the customers, they will in turn be able to reach the goals 
in the financial perspective. This naturally brings up the next perspective; what internal 
processes must be in place in order to deliver a satisfactory customer proposition. The last 
perspective is then supposed to describe the growth or innovational changes the firm need for 
the identified internal processes to be established. 
The BSC usually have about 5 indicators for each perspective, so the total amount of KPIs to 
be tracked by managers are usually around 15-20. As the BSC gained popularity among 
managers in the early 2000, Kaplan and Norton further developed it to include a strategy 
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map, which explicitly draws out the hypothesized causalities between the different 
perspectives and KPIs. This is enabling managers to better communicate the strategy down 
the organizational ladder, hopefully leading to better strategy implementation as employees 
are being made aware of how they are contributing and why they do. The BSC have been a 
success in management accounting literature and the authors has achieved praise for the 
modernization of the French tableau de bord. However, the management tool has also 
received some criticism, as no tool is perfect. The fact that managers can focus on such a few 
indicators have both upsides and downsides. Managers have to make sure the chosen 
indicators are in fact representative of performance, because there are many factors 
influencing the different indicators. Trusting blindly on the chosen few indicators may lead to 
a strategy implementation that has the characteristics of a train on the wrong tracks. 
Everything might be on track, but you end up arriving somewhere entirely different from 
what you had planned. The strategy map have also been on the receiving end of criticism. 
Norreklit (2000) accuse it of being too one-directional, as the chain of causality only leads 
upwards. Akkermans and Van Oorschot (2005) also point out that some of the indicators 
might be interconnected, which could bring about counterintuitive results in the process of 
implementation in the organization. Further, it fails to account for time delays. These 
weaknesses combine to illustrate that the BSC is rather static in its nature, but is nonetheless 
a popular strategy implementation tool for management. As a result of its popularity, 
literature on measuring financial and non-financial performance in more traditional 
organizations already exist in large numbers, but sporting specific literature regarding 
performance indicators are not that abundant. For that reason, one might also expect that 
existing literature lack some of the quality controls that articles in bigger academic journals 
achieve before publication.  It is also worth mentioning that the BSC is not able to answer the 
question of what the competitors are doing, which is hugely important in the business world. 
That being said, the founders of the BSC actually propose the use of system dynamics 





Jay Forrester, considered to be the father of system dynamics, has the following definition of 
system dynamics (Forrester 1999): 
“System dynamics is a professional field that deals with the complexity of systems. System 
dynamics is the necessary foundation underlying effective thinking about systems. System 
dynamics deals with how things change through time, which covers most of what most people 
find important. System dynamics involves interpreting real life systems into computer 
simulation models that allow one to see how the structure and decision-making policies in a 
system create its behavior.”(p.1) 
By creating simulation models one can gain insight into what is considered by Richmond 
(1997) to be the holiest of grails: high-leverage intervention points. These are places in a 
system where policy changes have the best chance of changing the state of the system 
towards a desired state. Meadows (1999) list places to intervene in a system in the following 
descending order of leverage:  
1. The power to transcend paradigms 
2. The mindset or paradigm out of which the system arises 
3. The goals of a system 
4. The power to add, change, evolve, or self-organize system structure 
5. The rules of the system 
6. The structure of information flows 
7. The gain around driving positive feedback loops 
8. The strength of negative feedback loops, relative to the impacts they are trying to 
correct against 
9. The length of delays, relative to the rate of system changes 
10. The structure of material stocks and flows and nodes of intersection 
11. The sizes of buffers and other stabilizing stocks, relative to their flows 
12.  Constants, parameters, numbers 
It is difficult not seeing some similarities between KPIs and leverage points. Both has the 
purpose of shifting a system from one state to another using some set of chosen variables 
deemed important in the system. Taking advantage of this knowledge, a manager might see 
that the third most powerful leverage point is the goals of the system and make sure these 
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align with the chosen KPIs such that policy changes have the greatest chance of changing the 
system towards the desired state. 
A dynamic balanced scorecard 
As introduced earlier, there is already a number of articles describing case studies of the 
development of a so-called ‘dynamic balanced scorecard’ using system dynamics simulation. 
Akkermans and Van Oorschot (2005) finds that use of simulation modelling was a good way 
to figure out the importance of time delays and accumulations, as well as testing the 
relevance of the chosen performance indicators. In most organizations, managers must handle 
these dynamic problems related to strategy development and the performance measurement 
associated with it. Using the concept of stocks and flows from system dynamics, Warren 
(1999b) presents a framework he calls a dynamic resource-system view (DRSV). The basic 
steps of applying this framework to practical cases being as follows:  
 Clearly state the time-horizon associated with the firm’s different strategic challenges 
 Find the strategic resources the firm need to develop, defend and connect in order to 
get a competitive advantage. 
 Of the aforementioned resources, pick out 3-4 tangible resources considered most 
important. 
 For each of these tangibles, figure out what is influencing the flows in and out of the 
stock.  
 After building a map of this system, identify the key decision-levers in it. 
This apparently integrate well with the BSC and concept of leverage points, as the recurrent 
theme is on identifying and developing key resources/performance indicators (or whatever 
the academics of tomorrow end up calling it). As previously mentioned, the BSC is unable to 
capture what the competitors are doing. However, in a second article Warren (1999a) explains 
how the dynamics of rivalry can be captured using the DRBV. Because resources are finite, 
the firm can attain and develop its resources by ways of capturing potential resources before 
their competitors, or steal them if the competitors have already captured them. The tangible 
resources are obvious and somewhat straightforward to include and model, but many would 
argue that intangible resources would be correspondingly important for a firm’s performance. 
In a similar article, Morecroft (1999) states that: “If we could understand more about all these 
tangibles and intangibles, -how they fit together, how they co-evolve over time, -then we 
would be in a better position to steer the firm along a sustainable growth path.”(p.26) 
19 
 
In the third and last article in the series, Warren (2000) discusses how to measure and capture 
the dynamics of intangible resources and capabilities, based on the impression that intangible 
resources are often overlooked in strategic plans because they are perceived as undetectable, 
unmeasurable and/or unmanageable. To better illustrate the importance of the concepts, Table 
3 show examples of intangible resources and how to measure and quantify them. 
Table 3: Adapted table from Warren (2000) with examples on intangible resources. Reprinted with permission. 
 Morale Reputation 
Product 
functionality 
Measure By survey By survey 
Fraction of user-
needs met 
Scale 0 to 1.0 0 to 1.0 0 to 1.0 
Inflow drivers Firm performance Marketing Product development 
Outflow drivers Work pressure Service quality Obsolescence 
 
He divides intangible resources into two broad categories. The first regard the characteristics 
or “attributes” that is associated with a specific tangible resource. These associations, along 
with some self-produced industry-specific football examples, are represented in Table 4. 
 
Table 4: Adapted table for tangible resources with associated examples of intangible resources (Warren 2000). Reprinted 
with permission.  




Telecoms Subscribers - Subscriber quality - Call volume: minutes/month 
Retailing Site locations - Site quality - Passing pedestrian traffic 
Banking Loans - Size of loans - Value € ‘000 
Football  Players - Player talent - Wages per year 




The second type of intangible resources is what he calls indirect resources, which reflect e.g. 
customer’s feelings or expectations about product quality. A change in an indirect resource 
may then lead to changes in flows of other strategic tangible resources.  
Table 5: Adapted table of indirect resources from Warren (2000). Reprinted with permission. 
Indirect resource Changes driven by (for example) 
Other resources flows 
affected by this indirect 
resource 
Staff morale - Work pressure - Staff attrition 
Reputation with 
customers 
- Perceived product quality - Customer acquisition 
Investor support - Financial performance vs. expectation - Investment rate 
Fan satisfaction - Team performance vs. expectation - Match-day revenue 
Quality and reputation are important special cases, as can be seen in how customers respond 
to a change in perceived reputation or if their expectations are different from the actual 
quality of the product. Notice that acquisition of potential customers is affected by the 
perceived reputation/ quality of the product and not the actual state. This makes the 
awareness of time delays in perceived and actual states particularly important in these 
settings. Warren (2000) goes on to introduce the concept of capabilities in the context of 
these strategic resources: “Capability – the relative rate at which the firm is able to build a 
specific strategic resource, for any given availability of the other resources needed for that 
task.”(p.54) This means that capabilities are what makes the firm able to accumulate and 
maintain their strategic resources, relative to external or internal benchmarks. If customers is 
a tangible resource, building on the previous example, then an associated capability would 
definitely be selling. A firm with a strong sales department compared to external benchmarks 





Chelladurai (2013) has long tenure in the field of theorizing in sport management and his 
scholarly work is triggered by gaps or apparent insufficiencies in a topic. The work is then 
either a synthesis of existing perspectives or a reconciliation of opposing approaches. The 
method developed in this thesis will be more analogous to the former of the two. It will 
synthesize different topics based on previous research, but incorporated within a system 
dynamics framework considered great at gaining understanding of complex systems. Using 
system dynamic tools to map and simulate the relationship between the chosen important 
variables is thought to give managers the opportunity to expand their mental models. In his 
book about business dynamics Sterman (2000) recommend a method for development of 
system dynamics models. Consequently, the succeeding section is a modified version of his 
framework.   
Problem articulation 
It seems like excellent financial results for shareholders and superior sporting performance is 
not simultaneously achievable for top European clubs. The model will base itself on a typical 
club in the BPL, because of the extensive amount of data available from it compared to the 
other big European leagues. FFP also imply that new owners with plans to inject capital/ cash 
into the club needs to provide a business plan for how they are supposed to get their return on 
capital from future cash flows. As the BSC is intended to be a strategy implementation tool, 
the model should be developed with an explicit strategy in mind. This will hopefully make 
decisions regarding boundaries clearer. When doing this, it is necessary to remember that 
mostly elements of the organization the board has influence over, endogenous variables, 
should be included (Richmond 1997). From the modeller’s perspective, it is equally 
important to figure out which variables that ought to be included as exogenous as well as 
those to be excluded entirely. This essentially means that there is a trade-off between breadth 
and depth in the model.   
The two apparent strategies that, at least on paper, seem reasonable to consider in 
professional football clubs consist of the two stable business model configurations mentioned 
earlier. They will be restated for the non-observant reader, but with additional explanations 
and assumptions in reverence of the observant one. Business model 3, hereby the A strategy, 
focus on buying expensive star players with massive talent to outperform the other clubs. 
This will in turn lead to better attendance at games, merchandize sales, etc. after an initial 
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period of rebuilding the squad. The assumed outcome of this was superior financial 
performance. Business model 2, hereby the B strategy, based itself on buying cheaper players 
with less talent. Because of the diminishing performance higher wages gives, this strategy 
offered decent financial performance as well. Different strategic themes and goals under 
these strategies bring about the identification of different KPIs and require that certain 
aspects and areas need more attention. For example, indicators for growth of fan base and 
revenue are expected to get more emphasis in strategy A. In a scenario where the club 
decides to invest heavily in tangible assets (e.g. new stadium, training facilities) a sustain 
strategy would give greater emphasis to e.g. debt ratios and cash flow.  
The A strategy is chosen, as this is the most relevant scenario to explore taking into 
consideration FFP and the amount of foreign investors in BPL. There are key variables and 
concepts that needs to be addressed, and introduces the following step in the modelling 
process. To make the identification of important variables and perspectives easier, this 




This stakeholder group is perceivably the most obvious one. Not only do the shareholders 
have a legitimate claim on the club, but they also have the power to affect decisions of the 
board because they own a share of the club’s capital. The shareholders needs constant 
attention, which makes this group a definitive stakeholder. 
Players/ agent:  
Because of the bloated demand for players, they possess a great deal of leverage in contract 
negotiations with the club. To achieve their objectives, which is usually higher wages, they 
can either sit out their contract to achieve higher wages in another club or let their agents start 
“rumor mills” in the media. Agents could be a stakeholder group of their own, but in this 
paper they are assumed to have interests equal to that of players. The club’s players also have 
legitimacy, because of their central part in the organization. Many players spend their entire 
career in one club, (although quite rare these days) hoping to win trophies with the club they 
love. Players getting dissatisfied could negatively affect the team morale and therefore need a 






The description of media covers the media companies that distributes the broadcasted 
matches, as well as social media and news companies. This group of stakeholders could also 
be separated into several parts, but it seems to add little value to the overall usability of the 
model to do so. Media are naturally interested in newsworthy teams and players. Usually 
these are star players and/ or big clubs with millions of followers worldwide. Providing 
coverage on these clubs are guaranteed to attract many viewers, which is important to 
increase the money that can be made from broadcasting deals. Given the steep growth for 
broadcasted matches, broadcasting revenue represent a considerable fraction of income for 
the clubs. Being media companies, the legitimacy attribute is by definition obvious for this 
group. Although this stakeholder have extensive leverage over the clubs because of the 
amount of revenue, the real driver of this revenue is the fans. It is therefore hard to 
characterize media as a definitive stakeholder, but they have to be recognized as very 
dominant considering the uninterrupted stream of news and the short time it takes for news to 
spread online. 
National football association: 
This stakeholder represent all the teams in the league and is understandably a group with 
much influence over the individual clubs. The legitimacy attribute is also a natural 
consequence of this embodiment. It governs the sale of TV-rights and how the share of this 
are to be distributed between the clubs, so league attractiveness through competitive matches 
becomes an important objective for this group in order to increase demand for televised 
games. Clearly, there is little need for urgency when dealing with this stakeholder, so it ends 
up with the classification as a typical dominant stakeholder.  
Sponsors: 
Sponsors and sponsorship deals represented in the football industry are getting larger by the 
year. Their objectives mainly consist of exposure to football fans watching games on TV and 
live in stadiums. The rising value of kit sponsorships is a testament to this. This also gives 
sponsors the power attribute because of the large amount of money involved. As the club they 
sponsor will be somewhat associated with their own brand, reputation of the club is also a 
factor that sponsors have focus on. Although this is a legitimacy attribute, it is interpreted as a 
potential attribute. Sponsorship deals are usually long-term, indicating little urgency. The 
aforementioned aspects would initially position sponsors as dormant stakeholders, but are 
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classified as semi-dominant because of their legitimate claim to represent clubs with a non-
negative reputation.  
Fans: 
Unsurprisingly, fans want their team to maximize sporting performance subject to the club’s 
financial constraints. Additionally, they want to watch their team’s matches without feeling 
that they are paying for overpriced tickets. Entertaining games and/ or star players contribute 
to reduce this emotion, while higher ticket prices increases it. Being responsible for a large 
amount of the club’s income through both ticket revenue and retail sales, fans are potentially 
a very powerful stakeholder group if their objectives are sidelined for a longer period of time. 
Examples of disgruntled fans can be seen in stadiums and on social media almost daily. They 
might complain about expensive ticket prices one day, while lack of ambition is the cause of 
frustration the next. Either way, fans need a watchful eye from the club. Because of this, they 
receive a classification as a semi-definitive type.  
Local society/ authorities: 
The only attribute this stakeholder usually possess is their legitimacy. They have little power 
to influence the club and does not need immediate attention. For football clubs, helping the 
local society could be a way to improve their reputation and give back to their local fans. 
Thus, this group is a discretionary stakeholder. 
The results of the stakeholder analysis are summarized in Table 6. 
Table 6: Results of stakeholder analysis. 
 Power Legitimacy Urgency Type Objectives 
Shareholders Yes Yes Yes Definitive 
Increased value of club, 
superior sporting and 
financial performance 
Players Yes Yes Yes Definitive 
Higher wages, sporting 
success, good training 
environment 
Media Yes Yes Depends 
Very 
Dominant 
Newsworthy teams and 
players, demand for 
broadcasted matches,  
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 Power Legitimacy Urgency Type Objectives 
National 
association 
Yes Yes No Dominant 
League attractiveness, 
balanced competition, 
compliance of rules 
Sponsors Yes Potentially No 
Semi-
dominant 
Exposure on TV and 
live matches, club 
attractiveness 








No Yes No Discretionary 
Economic benefit for 
local businesses, 
visibility to tourists 
 
The next step combines the objectives of the most important stakeholders to find suitable 
perspectives for the BSC and identify initial key performance indicators assumed important 
for the chosen strategy. It seems appropriate to group the fans, media and sponsors into a 
shared customer perspective, as each provide substantial revenue streams into the club while 
they are also quite dependent on each other. Players are mainly responsible for generating 
this revenue and shareholders will receive return on invested capital because of it. As these 
two groups is also definitive stakeholders, it seems suitable to base a perspective on each of 
them. The last perspective provide an infrastructure that assist the other perspectives to 
realise most of their main objectives.  
Objectives for the financial perspective is to grow the club while delivering excellent sporting 
performance. This is hypothesized to increase the value of the club and satisfy the 
shareholders and annual revenue growth is therefore identified as a key indicator. As 
described above, the three main sources of income is ticket sales, commercial revenue and 
broadcasting money. For the club to achieve the financial goals it needs to identify the main 
drivers of these streams. Growing the fan base is an important step, while also increasing the 
attractiveness of the club to improve the quality of the sponsorship deals. Both of these are 
dependent on each other as well as outstanding team performance to increase relative to 
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competing teams, which is naturally the main objective of the sporting perspective. A lagging 
indicator of how well the team is performing is the league placement while the quality of 
players in the club is the number one predictor of team performance. League placement and 
relative player wages (leading indicator) is therefore two key performance indicators for the 
sporting perspective. These three perspectives preserve important stakeholder objectives 
while progressing towards the overarching strategy. The last perspective will have focus on 
the recruitment and growth of players. Wage to turnover ratio keeps track of how much the 
club actually reinvests in player talent while level of shared team experience gives leading 
indications of how well the team play together.  Figure 6 provides an illustration of how a 
standard BSC dashboard could look with the assumed KPI’s.  
 
Figure 6: Example of a BSC dashboard. 
 
As pointed out earlier, one of the weaknesses of the BSC is its rather static nature. That is, the 
causal relationships in the strategy map are usually depicted in one direction without 
feedback. Figure 7 illustrates this “static” strategy map if the club were to end the strategy 




Figure 7: Example of a BSC strategy map. 
Dynamic problem definition 
Having developed an initial BSC, and recognized its inherent weaknesses, it follows naturally 
that the succeeding steps consist of investigating historical behavior of important variables 
and consider how their potential future development could affect the club. For behavior to be 
observable, the model should backtrack at least 15 year or longer. This enables comparison of 
the model to annual reports from football clubs or information based on periodicals regarding 
financial performance of football clubs. In order to observe different policy changes, an 
initial estimate for the length of the future strategic time horizon in the simulation was 10-15 
years. Consequently, because estimates are in most cases wrong, the chosen time horizon for 
simulation is set to 20-25 years. As can be seen from Figure 8, the average player wages in 
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the BPL have risen proportionally with the increase in league broadcasting revenue (BPL  
2015).
 
Figure 8: Historical average player wages and league broadcasting revenue. See appendix for details. 
As the growth in demand eventually diminishes while competition for player talent is greater 
than ever, clubs need to ask themselves the important question of how they plan to compete 
at the top level if they are too dependent on broadcasting revenue. Figure 9 provide an 
illustration of the relative interest in BPL compared to interest in football worldwide in 
2011/12 (BPL  2012). 
 





One can also see that the average stadium utilisation, described as occupancy (BPL  2014), 
have slowly increased towards 95% during the last 20 years. This means that clubs will find it 
difficult to significantly develop their match-day income without drastically raising ticket 
prizes or expanding capacity. How capable the club is at bringing in ancillary revenue from 
the fans already going to matches is emerging as potential candidate for this.  
 
Figure 10: Adapted figure of average stadium occupancy in the BPL during the last 20 years (BPL 2014). 
 
Formulation of dynamic hypothesis 
Recall that, from the theories described in the introduction, most clubs cannot compete at the 
highest level while being financially profitable because of the overpayment for star players. 
As can be seen from the causal loop diagram in Figure 11, the three main feedback loops 
generating revenue are positive. As long as the revenue generated from league attractiveness 
increases, because of the increased competition, Figure 12 illustrates that the wage level of 





Figure 11: Causal loop diagram of dynamic hypothesis for individual club behavior. 
 
Figure 12: Stock and flow map of player investments in individual clubs. 
31 
 
Development of a simulation model 
As all models by definition are wrong, the following section provides thoughts and 
reflections on estimation of model structure, behavioural relationships and decision-making. 
An important task will therefore be to find a balance between endogenous and exogenous 
variables that come in to question when making the model. These findings are summarized in 
a model boundary chart while the full model structure and its documentation are found in the 
appendix. 
As have previously been established, the league placement is mainly dependent on the wage 
bill relative to the other clubs in the league, but there are also other factors affecting the 
outcome of this. How much experience the team have playing together, support of the fans, 
team morale, injuries on star players is important to consider as well. Of these, the relative 
wage of players and team experience are the only variables that influence team performance. 
The fractional improvement in performance relative to changes in wages of players is not 
proportional, which implies that the effect of average player wages on team performance is 
diminishing as wages increase.   
On top of this, random factors affect the outcome of matches, and sometimes entire seasons, 
which makes a prediction of a team’s league placement based only on tangible, quantified 
factors futile. Leicester City and Chelsea FC represent a perfect example of this. Last year, 
the newly crowned league champions of the 2015/16 season, Leicester City ended up as 
number 14 in the league, while the champions, Chelsea, ended up as number 10 this season 
(BPL 2015). The best perceived way to model this would be to add a random deviation to the 
league placement the model produces, but this is not included as these deviations will smooth 
out over the years.  
Club supporters are assumed to be loyal to the club and not change their support to another 
competing club, given that the club performs within realistic expectations, as football fans are 
far more loyal customers compared to other industries.  
League attractiveness have substantial impact on the total broadcasting revenue the league 
itself can generate. For the BPL, the broadcasting revenue is very evenly distributed, but the 
percentage differs somewhat from the top and bottom clubs based on team performance and 
the number of their matches being televised. The number of televised matches is to team 
performance is throughout and at the end of the season. 
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Commercial revenue is affected by the attractiveness of the league and club. Negotiating 
skills stand central in this segment, but it is assumed that the effect of these are somewhat 
small relative to the actual impact of the fan base, media coverage and so on. 
Match-day revenue is usually affected by the global and local fan base, as well as the actual 
population in the nearby region. For example, the adjustment of ticket prizes will affect the 
long-term demand for tickets.  
Broadcasting deals are usually three years in length and divided into equal payments to be 
distributed between the teams over this period. In the model, the size of these deals is 
influenced by league attractiveness, which makes it indirectly exogenous. The percentage of 
broadcasting money to be shared equally between the clubs in the league is based on 
calculations on BPL data, which is found in the appendix. The rest of the total broadcasting 
money is divided equally between merit payments and facility payments. The amount of 
revenue merit payments a club receives is dependent on its league position at season end, 
while facility payments is proportional to the number of televised matches of the team. 
Televised matches of a team club is obviously affected by the performance, but also of the 
club attractiveness. Attractiveness is based on how big the club’s fan base is relative to the 
total football fans interested in the league. 
The table of expected ticket price is based on the assumption that fans, being as loyal as they 
are, are less sensitive to minor increases in the ticket price relative to their expected ticket 
price. The expected ticket price itself is usually a function of many of the variables 
influencing the attractiveness of the club as well as the average ticket price for the other 
teams in the league. In the model it is assumed exogenous.  
In the section of player transfers, the aim have been to give an overview of the aggregated 
flow of players. The manager obviously have information of a player decides to see out his 
contract, before he officially leaves the club. This makes the manager able to prepare 
potential transfer targets before the out-of-contract player leaves. The players out of contract 
is basically a function of the players coming in, with the average contract duration as a third 
order information delay because some players leave early while other stay longer. Agreeing 
contract extensions with players are included in this assumption. The concept of selling 
players is here assumed to be dependent of the club’s transfer policy.  
The trading of players and the entailing cash flows involved is obviously a big part of the 
financial management of football clubs. Player transfers between clubs in the same league 
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obviously affect the competitive balance within it. A question will be if the model should 
include the feedback of performance from other clubs through the trading of players, but this 
seem somewhat beyond the scope of this paper. The rivalry and competiveness of a league is 
actually critical to how attractive the league is and how it can compete with other leagues, so 
it should definitively be a topic for further research. 
Another issue arises when considering how to take into consideration the different transfer 
fees. Acknowledging that the fee the club pays for a player is important with regard to the 
balance sheet, as the evaluation of intangible assets are based on this. Depreciation and taxes 
follow as a subject for discussion, as these are very important in the financial management of 
every professional club with substantial expenditures on these intangible player registrations. 
A detailed modelling of these elements is omitted because it adds too little value in the 
analysis of the long-term dynamic problem.  
The prospect of increasing stadium capacity or building new stadiums is not included in the 
model, but is interesting to include in a potential improved model. 
Most professional football clubs in the top European leagues have their own junior 
academies. As the players come through the ranks they do not cost the club anything except 
their wages. The issue will be to decide whether a detailed modelling of youth academies, 
scout networks and other youth related activities are beneficial for the overall usability of the 
model. Players developed “in-house” will not be listed in the accounting books, but clearly 
contribute to team performance.  
How much detail should be emphasized for club staff is another thing to consider. Managers, 
coaches, medical personnel, administrative, etc. clearly contribute to how the club perform. 
However, this is assumed to be highly related to their pay. The change of managers when the 
club is having bad spells of performance is also argued to have minimal actual long term 
effects (De Paola & Scoppa 2011; Kern & Süssmuth 2005), which is why the concept of 
changing managers are ignored in the model.  
External payments is fixed as constant fifteen percentage of the total broadcasting money. 
Parachute payments distributed over a couple of years to clubs that get demoted is included in 





Table 7: Model boundary chart. 
Endogenous Exogenous Excluded 
League placement Average player wage in league Junior players 
Player wages Size of broadcasting deals Transfer fees 
Fan satisfaction Global football fans Stadium expansion 
Change in recent turnover League attractiveness Depreciation and taxes 
Value of club Stadium expenses Scout networks 
Fan base Staff wages Demotion 
Match-day income Expected ticket price Inflation 
Commercial revenue  Hiring/ firing of managers 
Broadcasting payments  Debt financing 
Shared team experience  Participation in European Cups 
To provide some insight about the flow of information and people, the following summary 
highlights relevant activity in different frames of time. 
Per week: 
Players usually come to the training grounds twice a day. E.g. one football session and one 
conditioning session. In the weekend’s they play matches.  
Per month: 
Usually around four matches per month. At this stage, trends and/or changes in information 
flows (fan satisfaction, media publicity, player morale, etc.) becomes visible. This can start to 
affect the average attendance of games, club attractiveness or team performance if the rates of 
flow stay unchanged for a while. This will in turn feedback into the flow of information to 
make a positive feedback loop. 
Per year: 
From this point of view, flows of players in and out of the club will start to emerge as a 
noticeable pattern. As club and player usually start to renegotiate contracts before it runs out, 
managers will get good indications if a player will leave the club before the contract ends. To 
replace or make improvements to the playing squad, the club has scouts to identify players 
that has the preferred qualities and add them to a list of transfer targets. This list acts as a 
buffer and makes the task of having the right amount of players for each season easier. In 
addition, if the club wants to invest in many new and better players they have to sell or make 





According to Sterman (2000), “model testing should be a process of controlled 
experimentation.”(p. 716) If both the modeler and client are to achieve better confidence in 
the model, and the results it produces, testing is an essential part of every model development 
process. Before starting different tests, the model should initially be in a balanced 
equilibrium. This means that stocks remain unchanged for the entire simulation period and is 
only possible when the flows into the stock is exactly equal to the flows out of it, making the 
net flow equal to zero. A goal seeking feedback loop in equilibrium will have stocks equal to 
their desired values. It is also advisable to find algebraic expressions for the initial condition 
based on other variables and parameters such that the model always start in equilibrium 
regardless of the input. After this, one can test the model by applying different shocks to push 
the model out of equilibrium to see how it behaves.  
Looking back on the process, the actual development went gradually over to what Warren 
(2014) describes as agile system dynamics. The process is explained in Figure 13 
 





Results/ Policy design and evaluation 
Figure 14 shows a base run of the simulator dashboard. The dark blue box contain variables 
regarding investment policies while the light blue have variables relating to wage policy. The 
variables in the gray box are exogenous to analyze the outcome of different scenarios based 
on changes in these.  
 
Figure 14: Simulator dashboard. 
Cash injection  
Figure 15 show a closer inspection of the variables related to an investment policy.  
 
Figure 15: Variables related to investment policy. 
 
The results of this policy and the comparison to the base run is seen in Figure 16. They show 
that an early investment initially increases league placement compared to the base run, along 




Figure 16: Dashboard results of investment policy. 
 
Aggressive transfer policy during cash injection 
Figure 17 outputs the results of having an aggressive transfer policy during the investment 
period. This mean that while the average player wages in the club is lower than that of new 
players, additional players are sold to make room for these new players and the effect of this 
is visible from the level of accumulated shared experience.  
 





Interestingly, and possibly confirming that individual hopes of increased revenue raises 
competition, Figure 18 display the effects of raising the ratio of wages to turnover from 0.6 to 
0.8. 
 
Figure 18: Results of changes in wage policy. 
Example of scenario analysis 
Figure 19 show how much the baseline is improved if the club somehow manages to improve 
the average merchandise consumption per fan from 1 to 1.5. 
 





The first thing to acknowledge is that the model is flawed. As the process of wrapping the 
model and thesis up, the thought of going back and give the model “just one more tweak” 
have been of particular high frequency. This is also a valuable insight learned from the 
exciting, yet sometimes excruciatingly frustrating, modelling process. Finding the balance of 
depth and breadth in the model have been tough, but made the learning process even stronger. 
As of current writing, there are aspects that still haunt the model/ author. It is lacking a 
realistic representation of financial management. This would immediately give external users 
better confidence in the model. Team morale is another obvious variable that deserves 
inclusion in the next edition of the model. The same goes for effects of supporter/ fan 
satisfaction on the team performance in home games. As strategy implementation is a 
continuous process, the model would clearly be improved if the user were prompted yearly to 
make decisions based on the available information based on the KPIs. Further, the transfer 
market is still not, in the author’s opinion quite representable of the actual flows in player 
movement between clubs. Without doubt, this part have been the most challenging part to 
model. Including the possibilities of entry to European Leagues as well as demotion, and a 
better depiction of the fan base and the acquisition would make the model even better. 
Finally, rivalry between teams in the league is non-existent in the model, which adds height 
to the already elevated confidence hurdle. Given the discussion of weaknesses associated 
with the model, it is still visibly capable of producing results that provide additional insight 
for management. For example, increasing the fan merchandise consumption by just a small 
fraction is immediately obvious to improve financial performance. The author himself, being 
both an avid football and system dynamics fan, should have recognized this as a KPI early in 
the process, but still managed to overlook in the process. This clearly confirms theory stating 
the poor ability of humans to include processes and variables that develop over time in their 
mental models. Experimentation with different dashboard variables should be a live 
experience and can not be properly reproduced here.  
Concluding remarks: The model have demonstrated how the use of system dynamics 
simulation can enhance long-term strategic management in professional football clubs.  
Future research 
Competition between top leagues and the how the different broadcasting policies is a very 









































Documentation of model  
 
(001) ACCUMULATED SHARED EXPERIENCE= INTEG ( 
increase in experience from playing matches-loss of experience from players leaving 
 , 
  Reference Shared Team Experience) 
 Units: people*minute 
  
(002) adding transfer targets= 
  MAX(0, Desired Rate of Finding Transfer Targets) 
 Units: people/Year 
  
(003) Adjustment for Squad Size= 
  (Required Squad Size-PLAYERS)/Time to Adjust Squad Size 
 Units: people/Year 
  
(004) Adjustment for Transfer Targets= 
  (Desired Transfer Targets-TRANSFER TARGETS)/Time to Adjust Transfer Targets 
 Units: people/Year 
  
(005) Aggressive Transfer Policy= 
  0 
 Units: Dmnl [0,1,1] 
  
(006) Amount of Cash Injected per Year= 
  3e+008 
 Units: cash/Year [5e+007,5e+008,5e+007] 
 
(007) Annual Broadcasting Money= 
  Minimum Broadcasting Money per Club 
  + 
  Total Facility Payments*Percentage of Facility Payments 
  + 
  Total Merit Payments*Percentage of Merit Payments 





(008) Annual Income from Sponsorship Deals= 
  Total Market Value of Sponsorship/Length of Sponsorship Deals 
/Number of Clubs in League*Club Attractiveness 
 Units: cash/Year 
  
(009) Attracting Fans from Word of Mouth and TV Matches= 
Average Matches Seen per Year*Factor for League Competitiveness*FOOTBALL FANS 
NOT INTERESTED IN LEAGUE*League Attractiveness 
 Units: people/Year 
  
(010) Average Contract Duration= 
  5 
 Units: Year [2,5,1] 
  
(011) Average Fraction of Local Fans Interested in Match Tickets= 
  0.15 
 Units: seat/people [0.1,0.3,0.05] 
  
(012) Average Matches Seen per Year= 
  5 
 Units: 1/Year [1,10,1] 
  
(013) Average Merchandise Consumption per Club Fan= 
  1 
 Units: cash/(people*Year) [0.5,5,0.5] 
  
(014) Average Player Wage= 
  TOTAL PLAYER WAGES/PLAYERS 
 Units: cash/(Year*people) 
  
(015) Average Player Wage in League= 
DELAY3( Minimum Broadcasting Money per Club*Percentage of Broadcasting Revenue on 
Player Wages in League/Required Squad Size, 3) 





(016) Average Seats Sold per Match= 
  MIN(Stadium Capacity, Demand for Tickets) 
 Units: seat 
  
(017) Average Shared Experience per Player= 
  ACCUMULATED SHARED EXPERIENCE/PLAYERS 
 Units: minute 
  
(018) Average Shared Experience per Player in League= 
  Reference Shared Team Experience/Required Squad Size 
 Units: minute [5000,20000,2000] 
  
(019) Average Time to Sign Transfer Targets= 
  0.5 
 Units: Year [0.1,1,0.1] 
  
(020) Broadcasting Value per Fan= 
  5 
 Units: cash/people 
  
(021) Capacity Utilisation= 
  Average Seats Sold per Match/Stadium Capacity 
 Units: 1 
  
(022) CASH= INTEG ( 
  cash flow in-cash flow out, 
   Total Size of Cash Buffer Needed) 
 Units: cash 
  
(023) cash flow in= 
  Turnover 







(024) cash flow out= 
  TOTAL PLAYER WAGES 
  + 
  Overhead and Stadium Expenses 
 Units: cash/Year 
  
(025) Cash Injections From Daughter Company= 
  Decision to Inject Cash*Amount of Cash Injected per Year*PULSE(Starting Year of Injection 
  , Length of Injection Period) 
 Units: cash/Year 
  
(026) Cash to Buffer Ratio= 
  MAX(0.4, (CASH/Total Size of Cash Buffer Needed)) 
 Units: 1 
  
(027) change in recent turnover= 
  (Turnover-RECENT TURNOVER)/Delay of Financial Reporting 
 Units: cash/(Year*Year) 
  
(028) change in ticket price= 
  (Indicated Ticket Price-TICKET PRICE)/Ticket Price Adjustment Time 
 Units: cash/(Year*seat) 
  
(029) Club Attractiveness= 
(CLUB FANS/FOOTBALL FANS INTERESTED IN LEAGUE)*Number of Clubs in 
League 
 Units: 1 
  
(030) CLUB FANS= INTEG ( 
  football fans becoming club supporters, 
   FOOTBALL FANS INTERESTED IN LEAGUE/Number of Clubs in League 
   + 
   Local Club Fan Base) 





(031) Commercial Income= 
  Merchandise Sales 
  + 
  Annual Income from Sponsorship Deals 
  + 
  Cash Injections From Daughter Company 
 Units: cash/Year 
  
(032) Decision to Inject Cash= 
  0 
 Units: Dmnl [0,1,1] 
  
(033) decrease in wages from players leaving= 
  DELAY3I(players signing*Average Player Wage, Average Contract Duration, 1.19e+007 
 ) 
  + 
  selling players*Average Player Wage 
 Units: cash/(Year*Year) 
  
(034) Delay of Financial Reporting= 
  1 
 Units: Year [0.5,2,0.5] 
  
(035) Demand for Tickets= 
  Local Club Fan Base*Average Fraction of Local Fans Interested in Match Tickets 
  *Effect of Ticket Price on Demand*Effect of Team Performance on Ticket Demand 
 Units: seat 
  
(036) Desired Cash Buffer= 
  5e+007 
 Units: cash [5e+007,3e+008,5e+007] 
  
(037) Desired Rate of Finding Transfer Targets= 
  Desired Signing Rate+Adjustment for Transfer Targets 




(038) Desired Signing Rate= 
  Adjustment for Squad Size 
  + 
  Expected Rate of Players Leaving 
  + 
  selling players 
 Units: people/Year 
  
(039) Desired Transfer Targets= 
  MAX(0, Desired Signing Rate*Expected Time to Sign Transfer Targets) 
 Units: people 
  
(040) Desired Wage to Turnover Ratio= 
  0.6 
 Units: Dmnl [0.5,0.8,0.1] 
  
(041) EBITDA= 
  cash flow in-cash flow out 
 Units: cash/Year 
  
(042) Effect of Demand on Indicated Ticket Price= 
  Table for Effect of Ticket Demand on Indicated Ticket Price(Demand for Tickets 
  /Stadium Capacity) 
 Units: Dmnl 
  
(043) Effect of Experience on Team Performance= 
  Table for Effect of Experience on Team Performance(Average Shared Experience per Player 
  /Average Shared Experience per Player in League) 
 Units: Dmnl 
  
(044) Effect of League Placement on Number of Live Televised Matches= 
  Table for Number of Televised Matches(DELAY1( League Placement, 5)) 






(045) Effect of Team Performance on Ticket Demand= 
Table for Effect of Team Performance on Ticket Demand(Team Performance/Expected Team 
Performance) 
 Units: Dmnl 
  
(046) Effect of Ticket Price on Demand= 
Table for Effect of Ticket Price on Demand for Season Tickets(Perceived Value of Match 
Ticket/TICKET PRICE) 
 Units: Dmnl 
  
(047) Effect of Wages on Team Performance= 
Table for Effect of Wages on Team Performance(Average Player Wage/Average Player Wage 
in League 
 ) 
 Units: Dmnl 
  
(048) Expected Rate of Players Leaving= 
  players out of contract 
 Units: people/Year 
  
(049) Expected Team Performance= 
  Table for Effect of Wages on Expected Team Performance(Average Player Wage 
  /Average Player Wage in League) 
 Units: Dmnl 
  
(050) Expected Time to Sign Transfer Targets= 
  Average Time to Sign Transfer Targets 
 Units: Year 
  
(051) Factor for League Competitiveness= 
  Minimum Broadcasting Money per Club/Yearly Broadcasting Money for League 








(052) FINAL TIME  = 2040 
 Units: Year 
 The final time for the simulation. 
 
(053) football fans becoming club supporters= 
football fans becoming interested in league*Fraction of Interested Football Fans Becoming 
Supporters 
 Units: people/Year 
  
(054) football fans becoming interested in league= 
  Attracting Fans from Word of Mouth and TV Matches 
 Units: people/Year 
  
(055) FOOTBALL FANS INTERESTED IN LEAGUE= INTEG ( 
  football fans becoming interested in league, 
   Football Fans Worldwide*Initial Fraction of Fans Interested in League) 
 Units: people 
  
(056) FOOTBALL FANS NOT INTERESTED IN LEAGUE= INTEG ( 
  -football fans becoming interested in league, 
   Football Fans Worldwide*(1-Initial Fraction of Fans Interested in League 
 )) 
 Units: people 
  
(057) Football Fans Worldwide= 
  2e+009 
 Units: people [1e+009,3e+009,5e+008] 
  
(058) Fraction of Interested Football Fans Becoming Supporters= 
  Team Performance/Number of Clubs in League 
 Units: 1 
  
(059) Fraction of Recent Turnover Available on Wages= 
  Desired Wage to Turnover Ratio*(MIN(1, Cash to Buffer Ratio)) 




(060) Fractional Increase in Rate of Gaining Experience= 
  Maximum Attainable Shared Experience/ACCUMULATED SHARED EXPERIENCE 
 Units: 1 
  
(061) Home Matches Per Season== 
  19 
 Units: 1/Year 
  
(062) increase in experience from playing matches= 
PLAYERS*Matches Played per Year*Minutes per Match*Fractional Increase in Rate of 
Gaining Experience 
 Units: people*minute/Year 
  
(063) increase in wages from signed players= 
  players signing*Wage of New Players 
 Units: cash/(Year*Year) 
  
(064) Indicated Ticket Price= 
  TICKET PRICE*Effect of Demand on Indicated Ticket Price 
 Units: cash/seat 
  
(065) Initial Fraction of Fans Interested in League= 
  0.1 
 Units: Dmnl [0.1,0.9,0.1] 
  
(066) Initial Membership Fee per Supporter= 
  3 
 Units: cash/people 
  
(067) Initial Player Wages= 
  5e+007 
 Units: cash/Year [5e+007,1.5e+008,1e+007] 
  
(068) INITIAL TIME  = 2000 
 Units: Year 




(069) Initial Transfer Targets= 
  2 
 Units: people [0,10,1] 
  
(070) Invested Capital= 
  Amount of Cash Injected per Year*Length of Injection Period*Decision to Inject Cash 
 Units: cash 
  
(071) League Attractiveness= 
  FOOTBALL FANS INTERESTED IN LEAGUE/Football Fans Worldwide 
 Units: 1 
  
(072) League Placement= 
  IF THEN ELSE( (Team Performance < 1),  
  MIN( Table for Effect of Team Performance on League Placement(Team Performance 
  ), Minimum League Placement), 
  MAX( Table for Effect of Team Performance on League Placement(Team Performance 
  ), Maximum League Placement)) 
 Units: Dmnl 
  
(073) Length of Broadcasting Deals== 
  3 
 Units: Year [2,4,1] 
  
(074) Length of Injection Period= 
  3 
 Units: Year [1,5,1] 
  
(075) Length of Sponsorship Deals= 
  5 
 Units: Year 
  
(076) Local Club Fan Base= 
  500000 




(077) loss of experience from players leaving= 
  Average Shared Experience per Player*Total Players Leaving 
 Units: people*minute/Year 
  
(078) Matches Played per Year= 
  Home Matches Per Season*2 
 Units: 1/Year 
  
(079) Maximum Attainable Shared Experience= 
Number of Years to Gain Max Shared Experience*Minutes per Match*Matches Played per 
Year*Required Squad Size 
 Units: people*minute 
 
(080) Maximum Broadcasting Value= 
  Football Fans Worldwide*Broadcasting Value per Fan 
 Units: cash 
  
(081) Maximum League Placement== 
  1 
 Units: Dmnl 
  
(082) Maximum Players To Sell per Year= 
  5 
 Units: people/Year 
  
(083) Merchandise Sales= 
  Initial Membership Fee per Supporter*football fans becoming club supporters 
  + 
  Repeating Merchandise Purchase Rate 




(084) Minimum Broadcasting Money per Club= 
Yearly Broadcasting Money for League*Percentage of Broadcasting Money to be Shared 
Equally 
/ 
Number of Clubs in League 
 Units: cash/Year 
  
(085) Minimum League Placement= 
  Number of Clubs in League 
 Units: Dmnl 
  
(086) Minutes per Match== 
  90 
 Units: minute 
  
(087) Number of Clubs in League== 
  20 
 Units: Dmnl 
  
(088) Number of Live Televised Matches= 
  Effect of League Placement on Number of Live Televised Matches 
 Units: Dmnl 
  
(089) Number of Years to Gain Max Shared Experience= 
  7 
 Units: Year 
  
(090) Overhead and Stadium Expenses= 
  1.5e+008 
 Units: cash/Year [1e+008,2e+008,5e+007] 
  
(091) Perceived Value of Match Ticket= 
  35 





(092) Percentage of Broadcasting Money to be Shared Equally= 
  0.67 
 Units: Dmnl [0.2,0.9,0.1] 
  
(093) Percentage of Broadcasting Revenue on Player Wages in League= 
  1 
 Units: Dmnl [0.75,1.25,0.05] 
  
(094) Percentage of Facility Payments= 
  0.0033*Number of Live Televised Matches 
 Units: Dmnl 
 Comment: Proportional to the number of televised live matches of the  
 team. The percentages are ranging from 3.33% to 8.5% per team 
 
(095) Percentage of Merit Payments= 
  0.1*(1 - League Placement/(Number of Clubs in League+1)) 
 Units: Dmnl 
 0.52% per league placement ==> Ranging from 0.52% (lowest) to  
   9.52% (highest) 
 
(096) PLAYERS= INTEG ( 
  players signing 
  - 
  players out of contract 
  - 
  selling players, 
   25) 
 Units: people 
  
(097) players out of contract= 
  PLAYERS/Average Contract Duration 
 Units: people/Year 
  
(098) players signing= 
  TRANSFER TARGETS/Average Time to Sign Transfer Targets 




(099) Players To Be Sold= 
  MAX(0, Aggressive Transfer Policy*((PLAYERS*Relative Wage Ratio)-PLAYERS) 
  )*PULSE( Starting Year of Injection, Length of Injection Period) 
 Units: people 
  
(100) RECENT TURNOVER= INTEG ( 
  change in recent turnover, 
   Turnover) 
 Units: cash/Year 
  
(101) Reference Shared Team Experience= 
  425000 
 Units: people*minute 
  
(102) Relative Wage Ratio= 
  Wage of New Players/Average Player Wage 
 Units: 1 
  
(103) Repeating Merchandise Purchase Rate= 
  CLUB FANS*Average Merchandise Consumption per Club Fan 
 Units: cash/Year 
  
(104) Required Squad Size== 
  25 
 Units: people [15,30,5] 
  
(105) SAVEPER  =  
         TIME STEP 
 Units: Year [0,?] 
 The frequency with which output is stored. 
 
(106) selling players= 
  MIN(Maximum Players To Sell per Year, Players To Be Sold/Time to Adjust Squad Size 
 ) 
 Units: people/Year 
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(107) Share of Broadcasting Money to Facility and Merit= 
  (1-Percentage of Broadcasting Money to be Shared Equally) 
 Units: Dmnl 
  
(108) signing transfer targets= 
  players signing 
 Units: people/Year 
  
(109) Sponsorship Value per Football Fan= 
  3 
 Units: cash/people [1,5,1] 
  
(110) Stadium Capacity= 
  60000 
 Units: seat [30000,75000,5000] 
  
(111) Starting Year of Injection= 
  2005 
 Units: Year [2000,2035,5] 
  
(112) Table for Effect of Experience on Team Performance( 
  [(0,0)-(2,1.5)],(0,0.75),(0.269113,0.769737),(0.470948,0.796053),(0.648318 
  ,0.848684),(0.819572,0.914474),(0.93578,0.973684),(1,1),(1.13761,1.03289), 
  (1.29052,1.06579),(1.45566,1.07895),(1.67584,1.10526),(2,1.125)) 
 Units: Dmnl 
  
(113) Table for Effect of Team Performance on League Placement( 
  [(0,0)-(2,20)],(0,20),(1,10.5),(2,1)) 
 Units: Dmnl 
  
(114) Table for Effect of Team Performance on Ticket Demand( 








(115) Table for Effect of Ticket Demand on Indicated Ticket Price( 
  [(0,0)-(2,2)],(0,0),(0.0550459,0.429825),(0.134557,0.640351),(0.244648,0.815789 
 ),(0.342508,0.868421),(0.446483,0.868421),(0.562691,0.894737),(0.672783,0.903509 
 ),(0.782875,0.921053),(0.899083,0.95614),(1,1),(2,2)) 
 Units: Dmnl 
  
(116) Table for Effect of Ticket Price on Demand for Season Tickets( 




 Units: Dmnl 
  
(117) Table for Effect of Wages on Expected Team Performance( 
  [(0,0)-(20,2)],(0,0),(0.5,0.5),(1,1),(1.65138,1.34211),(2.56881,1.62281), 
 (3.79205,1.75439),(5.50459,1.85088),(7.52294,1.91228),(10,1.95),(20,2)) 
 Units: Dmnl 
  
(118) Table for Effect of Wages on Team Performance( 
  [(0,0)-(20,2)],(0,0),(0.5,0.5),(1,1),(1.65138,1.34211),(2.56881,1.62281), 
 (3.79205,1.75439),(5.50459,1.85088),(7.52294,1.91228),(10,1.95),(20,2)) 
 Units: Dmnl 
  
(119) Table for Number of Televised Matches( 
  [(1,0)-(20,30)],(1,25),(1.75535,23.1579),(2.80122,20.9211),(4.25382,19.3421 
 ),(5.4159,18.5526),(6.69419,18.0263),(8.72783,17.2368),(10.5872,15.9211),( 
 20,10)) 
 Units: Dmnl 
  
(120) Team Performance= 
  Effect of Experience on Team Performance*Effect of Wages on Team Performance 






(121) TICKET PRICE= INTEG ( 
  change in ticket price, 
   35) 
 Units: cash/seat 
  
(122) Ticket Price Adjustment Time= 
  3 
 Units: Year [1,3,0.5] 
  
(123) TIME STEP  = 0.125 
 Units: Year [0,?] 
 The time step for the simulation. 
 
(124) Time to Adjust Squad Size= 
  0.5 
 Units: Year [0.1,1,0.1] 
  
(125) Time to Adjust Transfer Targets= 
  0.2 
 Units: Year [0.1,0.6,0.1] 
  
(126) Total Broadcasting Deal= 
  Maximum Broadcasting Value*League Attractiveness 
 Units: cash [?,?,5e+008] 
  
(127) Total Facility Payments= 
  Total Merit Payment Percentage*Yearly Broadcasting Money for League 
 Units: cash/Year 
  
(128) Total Facility Payments Percentage= 
  Share of Broadcasting Money to Facility and Merit/2 
 Units: Dmnl 
  
(129) Total Market Value of Sponsorship= 
  FOOTBALL FANS INTERESTED IN LEAGUE*Sponsorship Value per Football Fan 




(130) Total Merit Payment Percentage= 
  Share of Broadcasting Money to Facility and Merit/2 
 Units: Dmnl 
  
(131) Total Merit Payments= 
  Total Facility Payments Percentage*Yearly Broadcasting Money for League 
 Units: cash/Year 
  
(132) TOTAL PLAYER WAGES= INTEG ( 
  increase in wages from signed players-decrease in wages from players leaving 
 , 
   Initial Player Wages) 
 Units: cash/Year 
  
(133) Total Players Leaving= 
  players out of contract 
  + 
  selling players 
 Units: people/Year 
  
(134) Total Size of Cash Buffer Needed= 
  Overhead and Stadium Expenses*Years to Provide Coverage for Expenses 
  + 
  Desired Cash Buffer 
 Units: cash 
  
(135) TRANSFER TARGETS= INTEG ( 
  adding transfer targets-signing transfer targets, 
   Initial Transfer Targets) 









  Annual Broadcasting Money 
  + 
  Commercial Income 
  + 
  Yearly Match Day Revenue 
 Units: cash/Year 
  
(137) Value of Club= 
  Turnover*((EBITDA+Turnover)/Turnover)*Capacity Utilisation 
  / 
  (Turnover/TOTAL PLAYER WAGES) 
  - 
  Cash Injections From Daughter Company 
 Units: cash/Year 
  
(138) Wage Budget= 
  RECENT TURNOVER*Fraction of Recent Turnover Available on Wages 
 Units: cash/Year 
  
(139) Wage of New Players= 
  Wage Budget/Required Squad Size 
 Units: cash/(Year*people) 
  
(140) Yearly Broadcasting Money for League= 
  Total Broadcasting Deal/Length of Broadcasting Deals 
 Units: cash/Year 
  
(141) Yearly Match Day Revenue= 
  Average Seats Sold per Match*Home Matches Per Season*TICKET PRICE 
 Units: cash/Year 
  
(142) Years to Provide Coverage for Expenses= 
  2 











Player wage data 
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